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TOTEM AND TABU IN EXPORT TRADE
NORMAN E. HOLLY"
If a Kwatiutl violated tabu, he was in t-tfi-a most excruciating
state of ungrace. To question tabu was itself a violation. The tempta-
tion to question was alleviated by veneration of the ancestral myth,
consecrated in the symbols of totem.
The Kwatiutl's gods proved impractical under our sacerdotum
of exchange, so we invented new ones. Under our custom totem is
vested in commerce and it is guarded by tabu. It is tabu, for example,
to question the supremacy of commerce, particularly transactions
occurring between one tribe and another rather than wholly within
the tribe; even more so, to inhibit them. When discussing this tabu
one therefore avoids tfi-tfi by upholding the fundamental benefit of
non-interference. Under such circumstances, of course, experience
and cold logic are not absolutes but are relative to the ancestral myth.
Something of the sort must have influenced Canada six years
ago when she exempted export transactions from the provisions of
her Combines Investigation Act.1 According to prevailing myth,2
exports [totem] were threatened by external cartels [evil spirits or
devils]; it was therefore necessary to free export transactions from
the restraint of antitrust regulation [regarded by the priesthood as
tabu].
Exporting is patriotic; furthermore it is a priestly activity, so
he who questions the myth risks tft-tfi. When Mr. Robert McIntyre
communicated the export exemptions to us in this Journal two years
ago, 3 he was careful to avoid tfi-tf. In so doing he also avoided the
cold logic and experience-half a century of it, in my own country-
that has already accumulated through similar exemption from anti-
trust regulation.
As Mr. McIntyre noted, Canada's amendment is constructed after
the United States Export Trade Act, or "Webb-Pomerene" Law, of
* Norman E. Holly, Ph.D. (Harvard), from 1962-65 was with the Federal
Trade Commission, which is charged by the U.S. Congress with the adminis-
tration of the Webb-Pomerene Act. During this period he was senior economist
and project director for a major Governmental analysis of the Act's operation.
1 Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 314; amended by 1953-4, c.
51 and 1960, c. 45, s. 32(4) and (5).
2 See House of Commons Debates, 1960, vol. VII, p. 6974.
3 Robert W. McIntyre, The Purpose, Operation and Effect of the Export
Exemption Provisions of the Combines Investigation Act (Section 32 (4) and
(5)) (1964), 3 Osgoode Hall L.J. 106.
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1918. Like Webb-Pomerene, the amendment permits groups of manu-
facturers to conduct their export activities in concert, so long as
doing so does not "unduly" lessen internal competition or affect
domestic markets.4 In prognosticating the amendment's contribution
to Canada's social and economic progress, therefore, closer account
should be taken of the history of the Webb-Pomerene law upon which
it was modeled. The message of this experience is that Canada's
amendment was ill advised and that Mr. McIntyre was ill informed.
For immediate purposes a summary of salient points must suffice,
as space limitations preclude full recital of four dozen years and
hundreds of export trade associations. The author hopes soon to
present them in depth.
The Origins of Webb-Pomerene
It is generally supposed that Webb-Pomerene was designed as
an antedote to the foreign buying cartels of pre-World War I.5 This
is a romantic view and unfortunately also a mistaken one. The idea
of export associations as an exemption to antitrust regulation was
first voiced aloud in 1912 by the United States lumber trust, primarily
for the purpose of policing domestic price and production agreements
among hundreds of small West Coast lumber mills.6 The argument
presented to Congress was that a decentralized industry such as
lumber lay victim to foreign purchasing syndicates (none existed in
lumber at the time, but one never knew). The lumber trust's exhorta-
tions were lost upon Congress, but not upon oligopolists in other
industries.
At that time the United States copper trust (commanded by
John D. Ryan and Cornelius Kelley of Anaconda Copper Company)
were collapsing, their carefully structured price schedules having
been broken in 1907 by the Braden interests in Chil6. It occurred
to Ryan-having encountered the lumber export agreements through
4 The U.S. Export Trade Act exempts from the provisions of the Sherman
Antitrust Act associations created for the purpose of, and engaged solely in,
export trade; provided that they abstain from restraining domestic trade
and the export trade of their competitors and provided they do not "artificially
or intentionally" affect domestic prices in their commodity. 40 Stat. 516;
15 U.S.C. §61-65. Canada's amendment makes the Combines Investigation Act
inapplicable in relation to export combines absent a likelihood that they will
restrain Canadian exports, restrain a competitor or inhibit a potential com-
petitor in Canadian export trade, or lessen domestic trade "unduly" in their
commodities. "Unduly" is given the broadest construction, dependent upon the
increment of market control attained in combination. Benefit of doubt rests
with a perpetrator, since (unlike Webb-Pomerene) there is no regulatory
authority under Canada's amendment. D. H. W. Henry Q.C. before the Cana-
dian Manufacturers Association as noted in McIntyre, op. cit.; see also H.
of C. Debates, 1960, vol. IV, pp. 6973 and 6976.
5 See for example McIntyre, op cit., p. 111.
6 An excellent and detailed account of the lumber trust's operations is
given in the three-volume report of the United States Bureau of Corporations
entitled The Lumber Industry (1913). The West Coast mills had exported
under formal agreement since 1902, and two of its export associations later
registered under Webb-Pomerene--the Redwood Export Association (1912)
and the Douglas Fir Exploitation and Export Corporation (1916)-both
antedated the Webb-Pomerene Act (1918).
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Anaconda's vast northwest timber stands-that export agreements
could be used to regroup the copper trust, this time on an inter-
national scale including the Bradens. If such agreements could be
sanctioned in law, their true purpose (i.e., world-wide cartel manage-
ment) would be obscured and their operations blessed. So copper
took over the campaign from timber. The Export Trade Act was
in fact drafted by one Gilbert Montague, then counsel to Anaconda
Copper Company and a close associate of Ryan. Following several
abortive attempts to slip the draft act inconspicuously through Con-
gress,7 Ryan and Montague decided to stage the most massive demon-
stration then known to lobbying history. Together with other captains
of industry and not a few trust conspirators they organized a National
Foreign Trade Convention in Washington. No means went unexploited
for convincing Congress and President Wilson of the solidarity behind
Ryan's case. (In crusades of this dimension the flocking instinct
among priests of enterprise is enterprising in itself; the National
Foreign Trade Council which grew out of this convention still lobbies
and still convenes.) Of course the giant corporations merely pulled
the strings; it had been decided well in advance that "small business"
would be their front.8 Thus the myth was promulgated that export
exemptions were primarily to assist small entrepreneurs to find a place
in the international market that otherwise might be foreclosed by
those "foreign cartels".9 Interestingly, it was this same myth that
the Hon. Davey Fulton advanced in support of Canada's amendment,10
even though cartels are certainly not what they used to be.
The copper trust found success through political favor. It hap-
pened that President Wilson was indebted in office to some of the
agitators for export exemption. At their urging he appointed three
of their nominees to the newly created Federal Trade Commission
in 1914.11 Thereupon this majority directed as its first order of
business a two-year study of "foreign trade conditions". Its Report
on Co6peration in American Export Trade (1916) is a massive col-
lection of names, data and organization charts largely of foreign
seZling cartels (not purchasing, as originally) and state trading agen-
cies-much of it incomplete or misleading and most of it irrelevant
by virtue of World War I. (There were similar arguments presented
in Commons, only not so detailed.)12 Nevertheless it proved to be
7 On one occasion as a rider on an appropriations bill. Montague also
sought, unsuccessfully, favorable administrative decisions in the Departments
of State and Justice.
8 See Williams Haynes, The American Chemical Industry (1912-1922),
(New York, Van Nostrand Company, 1941), vol. III, p. 529.
9 See inter alia the first report of the National Foreign Trade Council
(New York); Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, 64th Congress, 1st Session (1916); 55 Congressional Record
3564 et seq. (1917).
10 H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. VII, pp. 4341, 6971.
11 George Rublee of the United States Chamber of Commerce; Edward
N. Hurley of the National Foreign Trade Council (Hurley had assisted Wil-
son's nomination to the Governorship of New Jersey); and Will H. Parry
of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce.
12 For example, Mr. Aiken in H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. VII, p. 6901
and Mr. Fulton at p. 6972.
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the irresistible force that swung Congress 180 degrees in support of
the Webb-Pomerene bill. Ryan and his copper trust won the day,
and thereafter proceeded to cartelize copper around the world, well
up to World War 11.13
Wemm-Pomerene in Action
Ryan's friends in other industries followed suit. More than half
of the first twenty associations registered under the Act were ulti-
mately discovered primarily to be conspiracies in restraint of United
States commerce. A large number of the associations registered
during the life of the Act were formed solely to promote and main-
tain international cartels (not oppose them) in industries such as
steel, petroleum, sulphur, rubber tires, zinc, electrical apparati, phos-
phate, wood screws, carbon black, alkali, pipe fittings, feed grains
and others. (Gilbert Montague made a good part of his fortune by
founding and operating some of these instruments.) Indeed, whenever
an association has encountered a foreign cartel in its commodity,
its response has been to join it rather than to fight it. Many other
associations were formed primarily for price leverage in domestic
markets or for coercion in foreign markets. 14 Several postwar asso-
ciations were formed specifically for price collusion in U.S. military
overseas supply, in A.I.D. procurement, in the P.L. 480 ("Food for
Peace") program, or other publicly financed foreign assistance pro-
grams. Where correction of such activities has occurred both the
courts and the Federal Trade Commission have found the only cure
to be curtailment of permissable Webb-Pomerene activities.
By any measurement undertaken, Webb-Pomerene appears never
to have benefitted either the small business in whose name it was
enacted or the United States balance of payments. Evidence to this
effect during the pre-World War II period is abundant.15 As to
postwar, an examination of all associations registered during a recent
five-year sample period shows two-thirds of them to be leading
members of industries falling within the Kaysen-Turner definition
of "Type I" oligopolies; 16 i.e., those so heavily concentrated that
13 Excellent albeit dated accounts of the early copper cartel and Webb-
Pomerene are given by Prof. Leslie Fournier in The Purposes and Results
of the Webb-Pomerene Law, 22 American Economic Review 18-33 and Carlton
Fuller, The Copper Cartel (1928), 6 Harvard Business Review 322-328. They
are well supplemented in the Federal Trade Commission's report on The
Copper Industry (1947).
14 An example of the latter is an association of leading producers of
cinema films who maneuvered first to exclude smaller independent U.S.
producers from Japan during the postwar occupation, and since then have
used their combined power to force theatre owners in small African and Latin
American countries to lease on undesired terms and to terminate leases with
certain competitor producers.
15 For example, see Part III of Small Business and the Webb-Pomerene
Act, Report of the Foreign Trade Subcommittee of the Special Committee to
Study Problems of American Small Business, U.S. Senate, 79th Congress,
2d Session (1946); and Consensus Report on the Webb-Pomerene Law (1947),
37 American Economic Review 848863.
16 Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, Antitrust Policy (Harvard University
Press, 1959), pp. 27-30.
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the top eight firms are unaffected by competition from below. Half
of the remaining third are in industries classified as "Type II" oli-
gopolies: those where the significance of competition from the lower
ranks upon the top eight is indeterminate. (The remaining one-sixth
comprised nine associations, only three of which survived the survey
period.) Only one of the associations in existence today can rightly
be said to be composed mainly of small producers in its commodity,
and its total exports have yet to reach six figures. Furthermore, the
webb-Pomerene movement itself is topheavy. Of the total exports all of
the existing associations claimed to have assisted during a recent
sample year, more than 70 percent (by value) was accounted foi
by only four associations, and more than 99 percent was accounted
for by only eight associations.17 The size and nature of the firms
conducting this business suggests that their exports would be un-
affected by the sudden disappearance of the Webb-Pomerene Act, at
least not deleteriously.
Clearly the Webb-Pomerene Act has performed not as Congress
hoped it might, but rather as Ryan, Montague and the copper cartel
intended it would.
Canada's Hopes
Can it be expected that Canada will fare better with her export
exemption? It is constructed directly after Webb-Pomerene, except
for being more permissive in exactly those sections which have
facilitated market abuse in the United States. Also, the Canadian
exemption affords no instrument for regular inspection and correction
of association activity prior to formal action, as Webb-Pomerene is
supposed to. Generally, it is observed that the degree of formality
required in administration of a statute varies inversely as to the
likelihood of its occurrence.
The brief history of Canada's export exemption is hardly com-
forting. "Cansulex", an association of Canadian sulphur producers,
is a perfect embodiment of the fears expressed by Mr. Howard when
the amending bill came before Commons. 8 Cansulex is officially
regarded in the United States as "the Canadian counterpart of
Sulexco"19-the latter being a Webb-Pomerene association which has
dominated world-wide control over sulphur prices and distribution
since its creation in 1922, and which is currently under grand jury
indictment for restraint of domestic and export trade. The formation
of Cansulex appears to have been inspired by a 1961 freight rate
ruling in the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission which would
have enabled Canadian sulphur to compete effectively in northern
portions of the United States. The I.C.C. proceedings were unsuccess-
fully contested by Freeport Sulphur Company, following which United
States producers filed an equally unsuccessful petition with the Tariff
17 Compiled from data scheduled for future release.
18 H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. VII, pp. 7001, 7010-7012, and 7363-7364.
19 United States Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1962, p. 1180.
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Commission for increased duty on imported sulphur. Cansulex was
organized immediately thereafter, in 1962. It is said to be dominated
in policy matters by Occidental Petroleum Company, as parent of
Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company (a member of Sulexco); and to
be under orders to ship exclusively through International Ore &
Fertilizer Corporation, another Occidental subsidiary. As the prin-
cipal dealer in Canadian sulphur, Cansulex is believed to function
in a price leadership r6le for Canadian exporters under a price struc-
ture in accord with Sulexco's (despite lower production costs in
Canada), thereby protecting both the uniform world price structure2°
and the domestic price schedule of United States producers. No formal
agreement between the two associations is necessary, since half of
the Canadian sulphur capacity is controlled ultimately by United
States firms.
In this instance Canada's export exemption amendment has re-
sulted in curtailment of sulphur exports to the United States and
in a world-wide firming of prices which (in 1964) led to upward price
adjustments on the North American continent. This resembles the
pattern under Webb-Pomerene.
The Ancestral Myth
With this in mind we return to Mr. McIntyre's totems on the
desirability for Canada's (or any other country's) export exemptions,
and on his hope
that the courts will give those export exemptions meaningful interpreta-
tion by allowing some latitude in the incidental effect which may occur
in the domestic market.2 1
How much latitude Mr. McIntyre would wish, and to what end, is
an intriguing thought. Nevertheless he has put his finger on a crucial
fault. The point is that the amendment, like the Webb-Pomerene Act,
is self-defeating. Either the prdvisos of s. 32 (5) which Mr. Fulton con-
sidered necessary to constrain "unscrupulous persons" and market
foreclosure22 are meaningless, or else they work to negate the whole
idea of export combination. It is not possible for entrepreneurs to
react one way about that portion of their trade which is external
and the opposite way about that which is domestic: legitimate con-
spiracy in one produces illegitimate conspiracy in the other, no matter
how pure the intention.23 And if, as Mr. McIntyre argues,
government interference is like pregnancy-you can't have just a little
of it.24
then what would he say about combination?
20 On world price maneuvres in sulphur see Reports of Restrictive Prac-
tices Cases (National Sulphuric Acid Association), Restrictive Practices Court
of Great Britain, L.R. 4 R.P. (1963); also "New Fire in Brimstone", Barron's,
March 20, 1961.
21 McIntyre, op. cit., p. 110.
22 H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. VII, p. 6973.
23 One domestic trade association in the United States quite innocently
refers to a Webb-Pomerene association in the same industry as its "export
division"--no doubt because they share the same office and the same officials.
24 McIntyre, op. cit., p. 113.
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Noting the "serious competitive disabilities" facing Canada in
world markets and the "small-scale operations" characteristic of
much of Canadian industry, Mr. McIntyre ponders the unpopularity
of the export exemptions among secondary industry. "The answer",
he says, "is obscure". 25 But that is only because he too believes the
tribal myth about exceptions to antitrust regulation being beneficial
to small business.26 Actually, the only obscurity is why any business
otherwise unable to export effectively should be interested in the
amendment. No Webb-Pomerene association of small businesses has
ever enjoyed success and long life, save two whose "success" material-
ized through participation in a world-wide cartel.27 On the contrary,
"the preponderant effect of the [Webb-Pomerene] act seems to have
been to facilitate the concentration of industrial power in the hands
of large enterprises to the detriment of small existing or potential
competitors."
28
But this is subordinate. We shall now risk tfi-tfi by engaging
the biggest totem of all. The fundamental theory behind Canada's
amendment, as behind its prototype the Webb-Pomerene Act, is that
antitrust regulation inhibits commerce. It is suggested by responsible
persons that "if laws are retained in all their rigidity" then Canadian
exporters will lose overseas markets to powerful overseas consortia.
29
So exporters should be permitted to fend off their powerful rivals
in combination. For what purpose? To undercut their rivals? This
is easier done individually. To take the market at a better price?
This may work if the rival is relatively weak, in which case their
worst enemies are each other. But if their rival is relatively strong
it can be effective only when both rival and domestic groups act
in concert. So there we have it: either the exemption is unnecessary,
or else it is necessary for a purpose we can't abide. The antitrust
laws were enacted because trusts were killing off free enterprise. Is
is exceptional when assassins cross national boundaries? If so, then
let's not lament I.T.O.; let's instead abandon G.A.T.T. and reverse
two decades of anti-cartel policy.
For that, in a nutshell, is what antitrust regulation is all about;
3 0
and the entrepreneurs who would lead us down the primrose path
of export exemption show a greater awareness of it than those who
are willing to take the trip. Otherwise, why not exempt all the other
industries that feel antitrust to be a burden? They've got problems too.
25 Ibid., p. 112.
26 See H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. IV, p. 4341.
27 Small Business and the Webb-Pomerene Act, op. cit., p. 65 et seq. The
average longevity of associations has been about four years.
28 Small Business and the Webb-Pomerene Act, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
29 Hon. Davey Fulton in H. of C. Debates, 1960, vol. VII, p. 6972.
30 See Wilbur Fugate, Anti-trust Policy: Damper or Bellows? (1959),
45 American Bar Association Journal 947.
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